[DV_listserv] Good Case out of US Supreme Court

[Domestic Violence issues]

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
SEARCH & SEIZURE-CONSENT SEARCH: The exception in Georgia v. Randolph does not
apply when the co-tenant who objected to the officers' entry has been lawfully arrested and
removed from the scene.

Fernandez v. California, 571 US __ (February 25, 2014). Defendant robbed the victim,
Lopez, on the street, cutting him with a knife. Lopez called 911, the police responded, and a
citizen directed them to an apartment. They heard sounds of fighting and a woman screaming,
and so they knocked on the door. A woman, Rojas, answered; she was crying, appeared to be
injured, and explained that she had been in a fight. When the officers asked Rojas to step out in
order for them to do a "protective sweep" of the apartment, defendant appeared, wearing only
boxers, and said, "You don't have any right to come in here. I know my rights." The officers
eventually arrested him for assaulting the woman and transported him to jail. About an hour
later, the officers returned to the apartment and obtained Rojas's consent to search it. They
found weapons and clothes that connected defendant to the robbery, as well as a sawed-off
shotgun. He was charged with robbery and unlawful possession of the shotgun, and he moved to
suppress relying on Georgia v. Randolph, 547 US 103 (2006), to argue that Rojas's consent was
not valid because he previously had objected to the officers' entry. The trial court found that
Rojas had voluntarily consented to the search and denied defendant's motion, and he was
convicted on the charges. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that Randolph
did not apply because defendant was not physically present when Rojas consented, and the
California Supreme Court denied review.

HELD Affirmed (Alito, J.) (6-3 decision). The state court correctly denied defendant's
motion to suppress. [1] "Consent searches are part of the standard investigatory techniques of
law enforcement agencies and are a constitutionally permissible and wholly legitimate aspect of
effective police activity. ... The owner of a home has a right to allow others to enter and
examine the premises, and there is no reason why the owner should not be permitted to extend
this same privilege to police officers if that is the owner's choice." [2] Under United States v.
Matlock, 415 US 164 (1974), the general rule is that "the consent of one who possesses common
authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, non-consenting person with
whom that authority is shared." [3] The "narrow exception" to that rule announced in Randolph
is "limited to situations in which the objecting occupant is present" when the officers obtain
consent from another occupant. [4] For purposes of the Randolph exception, "an occupant who
is absent due to a lawful detention or arrest stands in the same shoes as an occupant who is
absent for any other reason." The standard that applies is "objective reasonableness" and does
not turn on an allegedly "improper motive" in removing the objecting tenant. Because defendant
did not dispute that the officers had lawfully arrested him and removed him from the scene, his
objection no longer mattered for purposes of Randolph. [5] Defendant's argument that his
"objection, once made, should last until it is withdrawn" by him would be unworkable for many
reasons. [6] The mere fact that the officers could obtain a warrant does not prevent them from
instead obtaining consent to a search: "A warrantless consent search is reasonable and thus
consistent with the Fourth Amendment irrespective of the availability of a warrant. Even with
modern technological advances, the warrant procedure imposes burdens on the officers who wish
to search, the magistrate who must review the warrant application, and the party willing to give
consent. When a warrantless search is justified, requiring the police to obtain a warrant may
unjustifiably interfere with legitimate law enforcement strategies. Such a requirement may also
impose an unmerited burden on the person who consents to an immediate search, since the
warrant application procedure entails delay."
http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-7822_he4l.pdf

NOTES: [a] In a nice nod to victims, the majority noted: "Denying someone in Rojas's
position the right to allow the police to enter her home would also show disrespect for her
independence. Having beaten Rojas, petitioner would bar her from controlling access to her own
home until such time as he chose to relent. The Fourth Amendment does not give him that
power." [b] In Randolph, the Court suggested in dictum that consent by one occupant might not
be sufficient if the police removed the potentially objecting tenant from the scene in order to
avoid his objection. In this opinion, the Court backtracked from that suggestion and instead
adopted a standard of "objective reasonableness"-whether the lawfully arrested and removed
the person, regardless of what their motivation for doing that was. [c] Justices Scalia and
Thomas concurred by reiterating their position that Randolph "was wrongly decided." In their
view, Rojas's voluntary consent was sufficient to justify the officers' entry and search despite
defendant's objection, regardless of where he might be. [d] Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justices
Sotomayor and Kagan) dissented on the ground that, in their view, defendant's "objection to the
search did

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