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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=EN-US link=blue vlink=purple><div class=WordSection1><p class=MsoNormal>…that could affect how you charge and try DV as well as NON-DV cases. <o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>(From the DOJ Appellate division):<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><o:p> </o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><b>_________<o:p></o:p></b></p><p class=MsoNormal><b>BREAKING NEWS: DECISION YESTERDAY BY<o:p></o:p></b></p><p class=MsoNormal><b>OREGON COURT OF APPEALS<o:p></o:p></b></p><p class=MsoNormal><b>“<i>BOOTS </i>RULE” APPLIES IF BURGLARY CHARGE ALLEGES MORE THAN ONE INTENDED CRIME<o:p></o:p></b></p><p class=MsoNormal><b><i>State v. Frey</i></b>, __ Or App __, __ P3d __ (February 8, 2012) (Marion) (AAG Greg Rios).<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Based on an incidence of domestic violence in which defendant threatened the boyfriend of his<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>estranged wife with a rifle and then attempted to kick down the locked door of the boyfriend’s<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>apartment where they had retreated and taken refuge, defendant was charged <i>inter alia </i>with<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>attempted first-degree burglary. In accordance with <i>State v. Sanders</i>, 280 Or 685 (1977), the<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>burglary charge specifically alleged, in addition, that defendant attempted to enter the victims’<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>dwelling “with the intent to commit the crime of Unlawful Use of a Weapon, Menacing, Assault<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>and Murder therein.” After the jury was instructed and sent to deliberate, defense counsel<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>objected that the court should have given a “<i>Boots </i>instruction” that would have required the jury<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>to reach a separate verdict of at least 10-2 verdict on each of those “specific intent” allegations in<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>the burglary charge. The trial court overruled the objection, and defendant was convicted of the<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>attempted-burglary charge by a general verdict of guilty.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><i>Held</i>: Reversed and remanded (Haselton, J.). [1] Defendant sufficiently presented the<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>issue to the trial court “by way of a post-instructional exception, as required by ORCP 59 H, and<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>thus satisfied procedural and prudential preservation requirements.” [2] “In <i>Sanders</i>, the<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Supreme Court reaffirmed the long-established requirement under Oregon law that the state, to<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>convict of burglary, must plead and prove the specific crime that the defendant intended to<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>commit upon entry. That principle controls here. The test for whether a <i>Boots </i>instruction is<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>required is whether the law or the indictment has made the fact at issue ‘essential to the crime<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>charged.’ Under <i>Sanders</i>, the ‘fact at issue’ here—<i>viz.</i>, the specific crime that defendant<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>intended to commit upon entry—is essential to the crime charged. Accordingly, the jury must<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>concur on the specific crime that defendant intended to commit when defendant attempted the<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>unlawful entry.”<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/A141355.pdf<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><i><u>Note 1</u></i><u>.</u> The court noted that a <i>Boots </i>instruction would not have been necessary if the<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>prosecutor had elected a single specific-intent allegation for the jury to base its verdict on for the<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>burglary charge.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><i><u>Note 2</u></i><u>.</u> In <i>State v. Hale</i>, 335 Or 612, 629 (2003), the court held that a <i>Boots </i>error can be<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>harmless if the jury returns a guilty verdict on a separately charged offense that establishes that<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>the jury in fact reached a sufficient concurrence on one of the alternatives alleged. Thus, for<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>example, if a defendant is charged with burglary based on an allegation that he entered with an<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>intent to commit crimes A and B therein, and the offenses of A and B are separately charged, and<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>the jury returns a valid guilty verdict on either A or B along with a guilty verdict on the burglary<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>charge, then a possible <i>Boots </i>error for not giving an instruction requiring a separate verdict of at<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>least 10-2 on either specific intent A or B should be harmless.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><i><u>Note 3.</u> </i>It will be a week or two before we decide whether to petition for reconsideration<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>or review in this case and, if we do, it probably will be many months before this opinion is<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>withdrawn, reversed, or affirmed. In the meantime, it may be prudent to acquiesce in a <i>Boots<o:p></o:p></i></p><p class=MsoNormal>instruction if you have a burglary charge with more than one specific intent alleged. Other<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>alternatives: elect a single specific intent at the time the case is submitted to the jury or ensure<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>that the intended crimes alleged in the burglary count are separately charged in other counts and<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>submitted to the jury.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><i><u>Note 4</u></i><u>.</u> The decision in this case should not provide any basis to set aside a burglary<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>conviction that already has become final, nor should it provide a basis under ORS 138.083(1) to<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>“correct” a previously entered burglary conviction.<o:p></o:p></p></div>
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