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</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]--></head><body lang=EN-US link=blue vlink=purple><div class=WordSection1><p class=MsoNormal><b>JURY INSTRUCTION ON “INTENTIONALLY” WAS NOT ERROR EVEN THOUGH IT DID NOT<o:p></o:p></b></p><p class=MsoNormal><b>SPECIFY WHETHER PARTICULAR OFFENSES WERE “CONDUCT” OFFENSES VS. “RESULT”<o:p></o:p></b></p><p class=MsoNormal><b>OFFENSES UNDER <i>STATE V. CROSBY<o:p></o:p></i></b></p><p class=MsoNormal><b><i>State v. Durst</i></b>__ Or App __, __ P3d __ (March 14, 2012) (Washington) (AAG Christina<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Hutchins / AIC Jennifer Lloyd). In defendant’s trial on charges of unlawful use of a weapon and<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>menacing (and other offenses), he requested special jury instructions on the definition of “intent”<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>that stated that “a person acts ‘intentionally’ or ‘with intent’ when that person acts with a<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>conscious objective to” engage in particular conduct, and he argued that the state would need to<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>specify its theory of the conduct on which it relied. The instructions would have eliminated the<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>portion of the definition of the “intentionally” mental state that allows a jury to base a finding of<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>intentional conduct on the fact that the defendant intended “a particular result.” Defendant<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>argued that those particularized instructions were required by <i>State v. Crosby</i>, 342 Or 419<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>(2007). The trial court declined to give the requested instructions, and instead gave a “generic”<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>intent instruction that tracked ORS 161.085(7) by instructing the jury that it could find that the<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>defendant acted intentionally if it found that he <i>either </i>intended a particular result <i>or </i>engaged in<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>particular conduct. The jury found defendant guilty.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal><i>Held</i>: Affirmed (Duncan, J.). [1] Defendant’s argument that the “particular conduct”<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>instruction was necessary—and that the “to cause a particular result” was improper—is based on<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>an incorrect premise that menacing is a “conduct” offense and does not require a “result.”<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Rather, menacing requires proof both of intentional conduct by the defendant and that he<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>intended to cause a particular <i>result</i>—<i>viz.</i>, putting the victim in fear of serious physical injury.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>Thus, defendant’s requested instruction was incomplete with respect to the crime of menacing.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>[2] The trial court also properly declined to give the requested instructions on “intent” with<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>respect to UUW. The court’s instructions tracked the statutory definitions of “intent” and<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>“attempt,” and did not misstate the law. Because there was no risk of juror confusion, the court<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>was not required to give a more narrowly tailored instruction.<o:p></o:p></p><p class=MsoNormal>http://courts.oregon.gov/sites/Publications/A138259.pdf<o:p></o:p></p></div>
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