<html xmlns:v="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:vml" xmlns:o="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:office" xmlns:w="urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:word" xmlns:m="http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/2004/12/omml" xmlns="http://www.w3.org/TR/REC-html40">
<head>
<meta http-equiv="Content-Type" content="text/html; charset=us-ascii">
<meta name="Generator" content="Microsoft Word 14 (filtered medium)">
<style><!--
/* Font Definitions */
@font-face
{font-family:Calibri;
panose-1:2 15 5 2 2 2 4 3 2 4;}
/* Style Definitions */
p.MsoNormal, li.MsoNormal, div.MsoNormal
{margin:0in;
margin-bottom:.0001pt;
font-size:11.0pt;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";}
a:link, span.MsoHyperlink
{mso-style-priority:99;
color:blue;
text-decoration:underline;}
a:visited, span.MsoHyperlinkFollowed
{mso-style-priority:99;
color:purple;
text-decoration:underline;}
p
{mso-style-priority:99;
mso-margin-top-alt:auto;
margin-right:0in;
mso-margin-bottom-alt:auto;
margin-left:0in;
font-size:12.0pt;
font-family:"Times New Roman","serif";}
span.EmailStyle18
{mso-style-type:personal;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:windowtext;}
span.EmailStyle19
{mso-style-type:personal-reply;
font-family:"Calibri","sans-serif";
color:#1F497D;}
.MsoChpDefault
{mso-style-type:export-only;
font-size:10.0pt;}
@page WordSection1
{size:8.5in 11.0in;
margin:1.0in 1.0in 1.0in 1.0in;}
div.WordSection1
{page:WordSection1;}
--></style><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapedefaults v:ext="edit" spidmax="1026" />
</xml><![endif]--><!--[if gte mso 9]><xml>
<o:shapelayout v:ext="edit">
<o:idmap v:ext="edit" data="1" />
</o:shapelayout></xml><![endif]-->
</head>
<body lang="EN-US" link="blue" vlink="purple">
<div class="WordSection1">
<p><span style="font-size:13.5pt;color:black">(4) <a href="http://willamette.edu/wucl/resources/journals/wlo/orappeals/2013/10/state-v.-smith.html">State v. Smith</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13.5pt;color:black">Date Filed: 10-16-2013<br>
Case #: A147759<br>
Nakamoto, J. for the Court; Armstrong, P.J.; and Egan, J.<br>
Full Text Opinion: <a href="http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/docs/A147759.pdf">http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/docs/A147759.pdf</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13.5pt;color:black">CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: To prove that a defendant "hindered" a report under ORS 165.572, the state must establish that the defendant's actions made it slow or difficult for another person to make a report. That requires
proof of some discernible interruption or delay in the making of a report above the de minimis level.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13.5pt;color:black">Smith appealed his conviction for interference with making a report under ORS 165.572. Smith assigned error to the trial court's denial of his motion for a judgment of acquittal, arguing that the statute requires
the State to prove that Smith's conduct caused a specific result, namely that it prevented or hindered the victim from making a 9-1-1 call. The Court of Appeals concluded that to prove that a defendant "hindered" a report under the statute, the State must
establish that the defendant's actions made it slow or difficult for another person to make a report. That requires proof of some discernible interruption or delay in the making of a report. Evidence that there was a de minimis effect is not sufficient. Here,
the victim had already dialed 9-1-1 when Smith grabbed her charger, the phone stayed in her hand, she did not have to redial her call to 9-1-1, and she continued to make her report while Smith left the apartment. Therefore, the Court concluded that a rational
jury could not have found that Smith hindered the victim from making a report, however could have found attempted interference with making a report. Accordingly, Smith's conviction for interference with making a report reversed and remanded for entry of a
judgment of conviction for attempted interference with making a report; otherwise affirmed.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13.5pt;color:black">[Summarized by: Jennifer Jefferies]<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13.5pt;color:black">(5) <a href="http://willamette.edu/wucl/resources/journals/wlo/orappeals/2013/10/state-v.-roelle.html">State v. Roelle</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13.5pt;color:black">Date Filed: 10-16-2013<br>
Case #: A148785 <br>
Egan, J. for the Court; Armstrong, P.J.; and Nakamoto, J.<br>
Full Text Opinion: <a href="http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/docs/A148785.pdf">http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/docs/A148785.pdf</a><o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13.5pt;color:black">EVIDENCE: Under OEC 404(3), evidence of a prior criminal conviction used to prove the intent element of a crime, when the defendant denies the act took place, requires a jury instruction limiting them to first find
the defendant committed the act before considering the prior conviction for intent.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13.5pt;color:black">Defendant was convicted of strangulation of his girlfriend, AM. The theory of defense was that the incident never took place, as there were no marks or bruises of any kind. At trial, over Defendant's objection,
a prior criminal conviction for assault against AM was introduced to show the Defendant's intent, as well as the detailed facts leading to the conviction by AM. The court submitted the following jury instruction pertaining after AM's testimony: "[AM]'s testimony
is only admissible and relevant as to the knowledge element of the crimes charged. You may not consider her testimony for any other purpose. More specifically, you may not use her testimony to infer that Defendant has a propensity or tendency to commit the
charged crimes." Defendant appealed, arguing the trial court erred by admitting the prior conviction. The Court held that the jury instruction was improper because it did not limit the jury's consideration of the evidence on the issue of intent to after they
had first found that Defendant had committed the charged acts. As such, the "jury easily could have considered the details of Defendant's prior assault against AM to conclude that Defendant committed the charged acts or that Defendant had a propensity to
commit domestic violence against his partners, in violation of OEC 404(3)." Reversed and remanded.<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p><span style="font-size:13.5pt;color:black">[Summarized by: Ross Sutherland]<o:p></o:p></span></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
</div>
<DIV>
*****CONFIDENTIALITY NOTICE*****<BR>
<BR>
This e-mail may contain information that is privileged, confidential, or otherwise exempt from disclosure under applicable law. If you are not the addressee or it appears from the context or otherwise that you have received this e-mail in error, please advise me immediately by reply e-mail, keep the contents confidential, and immediately delete the message and any attachments from your system. <BR>
<BR>
************************************<BR>
</DIV></body>
</html>