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<p class="MsoNormal">Good Morning,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">I’d previously sent out the legal update on <i>Fernandez v. California</i> (below). However, I thought I would re-send it along with a great summary/article (attached) about the case, done by AEquitas.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">If you haven’t checkout out AEquitas’ website or resources, you should:
<a href="http://www.aequitasresource.org/">http://www.aequitasresource.org/</a><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><o:p> </o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><o:p> </o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>SEARCH & SEIZURE—CONSENT SEARCH: The exception in <i>Georgia v. Randolph
</i>does not<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>apply when the co-tenant who objected to the officers’ entry has been lawfully arrested and<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>removed from the scene.<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><o:p> </o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><i>Fernandez v. California</i></b>, 571 US __ (February 25, 2014). Defendant robbed the victim,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Lopez, on the street, cutting him with a knife. Lopez called 911, the police responded, and a<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">citizen directed them to an apartment. They heard sounds of fighting and a woman screaming,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">and so they knocked on the door. A woman, Rojas, answered; she was crying, appeared to be<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">injured, and explained that she had been in a fight. When the officers asked Rojas to step out in<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">order for them to do a “protective sweep” of the apartment, defendant appeared, wearing only<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">boxers, and said, “You don’t have any right to come in here. I know my rights.” The officers<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">eventually arrested him for assaulting the woman and transported him to jail. About an hour<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">later, the officers returned to the apartment and obtained Rojas’s consent to search it. They<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">found weapons and clothes that connected defendant to the robbery, as well as a sawed-off<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">shotgun. He was charged with robbery and unlawful possession of the shotgun, and he moved to<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">suppress relying on <i>Georgia v. Randolph</i>, 547 US 103 (2006), to argue that Rojas’s consent was<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">not valid because he previously had objected to the officers’ entry. The trial court found that<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Rojas had voluntarily consented to the search and denied defendant’s motion, and he was<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">convicted on the charges. The California Court of Appeal affirmed, concluding that
<i>Randolph<o:p></o:p></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">did not apply because defendant was not physically present when Rojas consented, and the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">California Supreme Court denied review.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><i>HELD</i>:</b> Affirmed (Alito, J.) (6-3 decision). The state court correctly denied defendant’s<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">motion to suppress. [1] “Consent searches are part of the standard investigatory techniques of<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">law enforcement agencies and are a constitutionally permissible and wholly legitimate aspect of<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">effective police activity. ... The owner of a home has a right to allow others to enter and<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">examine the premises, and there is no reason why the owner should not be permitted to extend<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">this same privilege to police officers if that is the owner’s choice.” [2] Under
<i>United States v.<o:p></o:p></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i>Matlock</i>, 415 US 164 (1974), the general rule is that “the consent of one who possesses common<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">authority over premises or effects is valid as against the absent, non-consenting person with<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">whom that authority is shared.” [3] The “narrow exception” to that rule announced in
<i>Randolph<o:p></o:p></i></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">is “limited to situations in which the objecting occupant is present” when the officers obtain<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">consent from another occupant. [4] For purposes of the <i>Randolph
</i>exception, “an occupant who<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">is absent due to a lawful detention or arrest stands in the same shoes as an occupant who is<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">absent for any other reason.” The standard that applies is “objective reasonableness” and does<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">not turn on an allegedly “improper motive” in removing the objecting tenant. Because defendant<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">did not dispute that the officers had lawfully arrested him and removed him from the scene, his<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">objection no longer mattered for purposes of <i>Randolph</i>. [5] Defendant’s argument that his<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">“objection, once made, should last until it is withdrawn” by him would be unworkable for many<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">reasons. [6] The mere fact that the officers could obtain a warrant does not prevent them from<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">instead obtaining consent to a search: “A warrantless consent search is reasonable and thus<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">consistent with the Fourth Amendment irrespective of the availability of a warrant. Even with<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">modern technological advances, the warrant procedure imposes burdens on the officers who wish<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">to search, the magistrate who must review the warrant application, and the party willing to give<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">consent. When a warrantless search is justified, requiring the police to obtain a warrant may<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">unjustifiably interfere with legitimate law enforcement strategies. Such a requirement may also<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">impose an unmerited burden on the person who consents to an immediate search, since the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">warrant application procedure entails delay.”<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><a href="http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-7822_he4l.pdf">http://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/13pdf/12-7822_he4l.pdf</a><o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><o:p> </o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><i>Notes</i>:</b> [a] In a nice nod to victims, the majority noted: “Denying someone in Rojas’s<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">position the right to allow the police to enter <i>her </i>home would also show disrespect for her<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">independence. Having beaten Rojas, petitioner would bar her from controlling access to her own<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">home until such time as he chose to relent. The Fourth Amendment does not give him that<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">power.” [b] In <i>Randolph</i>, the Court suggested in <i>dictum
</i>that consent by one occupant might not<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">be sufficient if the police removed the potentially objecting tenant from the scene in order to<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">avoid his objection. In this opinion, the Court backtracked from that suggestion and instead<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">adopted a standard of “objective reasonableness”—whether the lawfully arrested and removed<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">the person, regardless of what their motivation for doing that was. [c] Justices Scalia and<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Thomas concurred by reiterating their position that <i>Randolph
</i>“was wrongly decided.” In their<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">view, Rojas’s voluntary consent was sufficient to justify the officers’ entry and search despite<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">defendant’s objection, regardless of where he might be. [d] Justice Ginsburg (joined by Justices<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Sotomayor and Kagan) dissented on the ground that, in their view, defendant’s “objection to the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">search did not become null upon his arrest and removal from the scene.”<o:p></o:p></p>
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