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<p class="MsoNormal"><b><span style="font-size:14.0pt">**This case was tried pre-<i>Williams</i> and the line of cases interpreting
<i>Williams</i>. In this case, the trial court admitted Defendant’s prior threats to kill the victim based on 404(3)<i> Johns</i> analysis. The COA determined that the proper basis for admissibility is under 404(3) hostile motive which requires a different
analysis than doctrine of chances (<i>Johns</i>). The COA determined that the evidence offered does not pass that analysis because it is not “logically relevant.” The court spends quite a bit of time discussing logical relevance (starts on page 171). However,
there is no discussion of the nuances of a DV relationship, DV dynamics, or that, by definition, DV is a pattern of behavior—a review by the court of any of these topics could’ve/would’ve, I hope, satisfied the court that, indeed, that there actually WAS “a
substantial connecting link between the prior threat and the charged assault.” I would recommend that prosecutors take a look at the court’s discussion. I have not yet heard whether Appellate will be seeking review of this decision.
<o:p></o:p></span></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><o:p> </o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>From Oregon DOJ Appellate Division: <o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><o:p> </o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>EVIDENCE—RELEVANCE (OEC 401): In prosecution for domestic assault in which<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>defendant’s defense was that he hit his wife accidentally, evidence of his long-ago<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b>threat to kill her was not logically relevant and thus should not have been admitted.<o:p></o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><o:p> </o:p></b></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><b><i>State v. Wright</i></b>, 283 Or App 160, __ P3d __ (2016) (Klamath) (AAG Dave<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Thompson). Defendant struck and injured his wife during a domestic dispute, and he was<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">charged with fourth-degree assault. His defense was that he hit her accidentally. At trial,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">the state offered evidence that a few years previously he had made a threat to the victim<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">that he would take her out into the woods and kill her. Defendant objected to the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">evidence as irrelevant, but the court (Judge Dan Bunch) overruled that objection and<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">admitted the evidence, on the theory that it was relevant to show that defendant had<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">caused his wife’s injuries intentionally, not accidentally. The jury found defendant<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">guilty.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><i>Held</i>: Reversed and remanded (Duncan, P.J.). The trial court erred by admitting<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">the evidence at issue, because the evidence of the prior threat was not logically relevant.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">[1] In <i>State v. Williams</i>, 357 Or 1 (2015), the court held that, for evidence of a criminal<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">defendant’s other acts, OEC 404(4) supersedes OEC 404(3) as the controlling rule. But<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">the Court of Appeals has held in several post-<i>Williams </i>
cases that the types of relevant<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">evidence set out in OEC 404(3) remain viable theories for admission of prior acts<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">evidence. “Thus, in evaluating whether evidence of ‘other crimes, wrongs or acts’ is<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">admissible for nonpropensity purposes, we may draw on the ‘settled principles’ of<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">relevance embodied in OEC 404(3) and case law construing that provision.” [2] The<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">trial court applied the relevance test set out in <i>State v. Johns</i>, 301 Or 535 (1986), in<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">admitting the prior-threat evidence. But the <i>Johns </i>test applies only when the prior-acts<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">evidence is offered on a doctrine-of-chances theory. Because the prior-threat evidence<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">was not offered under that theory, the court improperly applied the
<i>Johns </i>test. [3]<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">Instead, the evidence—offered by the state to show that defendant had continuing hostile<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">feelings toward his wife (a hostile-motive theory), and thus to help prove that defendant<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">had <i>intentionally </i>injured his wife—was subject to the following test: (1) the evidence<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">must be logically relevant under OEC 401, and (2) under OEC 404(3), the evidence must<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">be probative of something other than disposition to do evil. [4] The prior-threat evidence<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">did not meet the first part of that test: it was not logically relevant because there wasn’t a<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">substantial connecting link between the prior threat and the charged assault. “In short,<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">[the prior-threat evidence] does not contain evidence from which a non-speculative<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">inference could be drawn regarding whether the motive for the threat—hostility—was<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">likely to persist until, or recur on, the date of the charged crime and motivate the<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">commission of that crime.” Therefore, under OEC 404(3), this other-act evidence was<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal">inadmissible.<o:p></o:p></p>
<p class="MsoNormal"><a href="http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/docs/A153774.pdf">http://www.publications.ojd.state.or.us/docs/A153774.pdf</a><o:p></o:p></p>
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