[DV_listserv] Clarification on Jury Instruction

[Domestic Violence issues]

JURY INSTRUCTION ON "INTENTIONALLY" WAS NOT ERROR EVEN THOUGH IT DID NOT
SPECIFY WHETHER PARTICULAR OFFENSES WERE "CONDUCT" OFFENSES VS. "RESULT"
OFFENSES UNDER STATE V. CROSBY
State v. Durst__ Or App __, __ P3d __ (March 14, 2012) (Washington) (AAG Christina
Hutchins / AIC Jennifer Lloyd). In defendant's trial on charges of unlawful use of a weapon and
menacing (and other offenses), he requested special jury instructions on the definition of "intent"
that stated that "a person acts 'intentionally' or 'with intent' when that person acts with a
conscious objective to" engage in particular conduct, and he argued that the state would need to
specify its theory of the conduct on which it relied. The instructions would have eliminated the
portion of the definition of the "intentionally" mental state that allows a jury to base a finding of
intentional conduct on the fact that the defendant intended "a particular result." Defendant
argued that those particularized instructions were required by State v. Crosby, 342 Or 419
(2007). The trial court declined to give the requested instructions, and instead gave a "generic"
intent instruction that tracked ORS 161.085(7) by instructing the jury that it could find that the
defendant acted intentionally if it found that he either intended a particular result or engaged in
particular conduct. The jury found defendant guilty.
Held: Affirmed (Duncan, J.). [1] Defendant's argument that the "particular conduct"
instruction was necessary-and that the "to cause a particular result" was improper-is based on
an incorrect premise that menacing is a "conduct" offense and does not require a "result."
Rather, menacing requires proof both of intentional conduct by the defendant and that he
intended to cause a particular result-viz., putting the victim in fear of serious physical injury.
Thus, defendant's requested instruction was incomplete with respect to the crime of menacing.
[2] The trial court also properly declined to give the requested instructions on "intent" with
respect to UUW. The court's instructions tracked the statutory definitions of "intent" and
"attempt," and did not misstate the law. Because there was no risk of juror confusion, the court
was not required to give a more narrowly tailored instruction.
http://courts.oregon.gov/sites/Publications/A138259.pdf

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